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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

appellants

respectfully

petition

this

Court

for

rehearing.
III.
INTRODUCTION
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the DeBrys
waived their right to object to procedural irregularities.
Slip Opinion, Exhibit M at 2.)

(See,

As a basis for granting summary

disposition, this Court concluded:
[A]ppellantsf motion to amend the December 11
order did not mention any of the asserted
irregularities but merely sought to delete
references to rule 52(b).
We therefore
conclude that appellants have waived the right
to assert that Fidelity committed procedural
violations in obtaining the December 11 order.
Slip Opinion at 2.
Rehearing is appropriate in this case because the record
shows that the alleged procedural irregularities by Fidelity's
counsel were in fact raised in the trial court as a basis for
asking the court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the
December 11, 1990 order.
IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE PETITION
On March 28, 1990, the trial court in this case granted
summary judgment in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company ("Fidelity") and certified the case for appeal under Rule
1

54(b) U.R.C.P. Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity
hand delivered Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment to the DeBrys1 counsel.

(See Exhibit A, Appendix.)

On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed findings
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to all other counsel in
the case. (Exhibit B, Appendix.)
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings
and judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit C, Appendix.)
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys1 Counsel filed objections to
the form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.

(Exhibit D, Appendix.)

Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit E, Appendix.)

For the next seven

months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot,
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b)
motion.
Approximately seven months later, Fidelity, ex parte.
obtained the signature of the trial court on an order which purported to deny a Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend the May 2,
1990 judgment. (Exhibit F, Appendix.)
Due to a filing error, counsel for the DeBrys was unaware
the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit F) had been sent to the court.
See, Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, Appendix, at para. 2.
2

Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990
order, (Exhibit F) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal.
Eight months later, when Fidelity filed its brief in the
Court of Appeals, it then claimed the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys1 appeal on its merits because there
was no notice of appeal filed following entry of the December 11,
1990 Order. (Exhibit F.)
of Appeals at Point I.

See, Appellee's Brief filed in the Court
(Exhibit H.)

Upon receipt of appellee's brief, counsel for the DeBrys
first became aware that the December 11,1990 order had been signed
and entered.1

Counsel then filed a motion with the district court

asking the trial court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the
order or to vacate the order.

(Exhibit I, Appendix.)

The memorandum filed with the motion, pursuant to Rule 4501 (Exhibit J, Appendix), argued procedural irregularities as a
basis for the relief sought by the DeBrys.
The issue of procedural irregularities was again raised
in the reply memorandum filed in the trial court.

(Exhibit K,

Appendix.)
At oral argument on the motion, the court was informed
that a filing error had denied to counsel notice that Fidelity had
^hile it is true a copy of the proposed December 11, 1990
order was mailed to counsel on November 16, 1990, a filing mistake
at counsel's office resulted in counsel not seeing the proposed
order prior to filing and counsel was never aware the order was
proposed or signed. (See Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Ex. G.)
3

submitted the December 11 order for signature by the court.

See.

Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, at para. 5(a).
Counsel argued to the trial court at oral argument that
had Fidelity followed Rules 4-501 and 4-504 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, at least three separate notices would have
come to plaintiff and the filing error would not have denied the
DeBrys the notice necessary to protect their rights to appeal the
December 11, 1990 order.

Id. at para. 5(d).

Because counsel was unaware the December 11, 1990 order
was entered, no new notice of appeal was filed.

The failure to

file a new notice resulted in dismissal of the original appeal
(Case No. 910329-CA) for lack of jurisdiction.

(Exhibit L.)

V.
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS BASED UPON THE ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTION THAT FIDELITY'S PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS
WERE WAIVED BY APPELLANT
This court granted summary disposition based upon an
erroneous

assumption

that

the

DeBrys

had

waived

Fidelity's

procedural defects by not raising them in the trial court.
court stated:
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated
seven procedural rules in obtaining the
December 11, 1990 order. However, on November
16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel a
copy of the proposed order denying appellants'
objections and additions to proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants
did not object to the proposed order and did
4

The

not raise any of the alleged procedural
irregularities.
In addition, appellants'
motion to amend the December 11 order did not
mention any of the asserted irregularities but
merely sought to delete references to Rule
52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity
committed procedural violations in obtaining
the December 11 order.
Slip Opinion at 2, Exhibit M, Appendix.
The

foundation

of

this

Court's

opinion

granting dismissal consists of two assumptions.
1)

(Exhibit

M)

They are:

The DeBrys had notice of the proposed December 11,
1990 order and did not object to its entry; and

2)

The procedural irregularities surrounding entry of
the December
counsel

in

11, 1990 order were not raised by
his

motion

to

amend

or

vacate

the

December 11, 1990 order and were not brought to the
attention of the trial court.
See, Slip Opinion at 2.
Both

of these

assumptions

are

erroneous.

Counsel's

motion to alter or vacate the December 11, 1990 order was supported
by a memorandum (Exhibit J) which expressly raised the procedural
irregularities.

See, pp. 4-5, Exhibit J.

The reply memorandum

again raised the issue of procedural irregularities.

See, Exhibit

K, pp. 4-5.
The

fact

that

counsel

was

unaware

of

the

proposed

December 11, 1990 order due to a filing error was also raised at

5

oral argument on the motions.

See. Affidavit of Edward T. Wells,

Exhibit G at para. 5-7.
Thus, this court's assumption that counsel for the DeBrys
knowingly failed to object to the proposed order of December 11 and
waived Fidelity's procedural errors, has no basis in the record.
The record shows the opposite to be true.
Rehearing should be granted because this court's decision
was based on an erroneous assumption that the DeBrys had waived
Fidelity's procedural misconduct.
VI.
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I

hereby

certify

that

the

foregoing

Petition

for

Rehearing is filed in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

DATED this

/—^ day of July, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, (DeBry v. Fidelity) were mailed,
postage prepaid, on the

/-^ day of July, 1992, to the following:

Lynn McMurray
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3J-039/jn
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EXHIBIT A

Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
Lynn C McMurray, No, 2213
Attorneys for Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company and
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
Canada Life Assurance Company
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

ROBERT C. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY
Plaintiff,

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. al.,
Defendants.

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Consolidated Civil No. C86-553
Plaintiff,
Judge Pat B. Brian
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual
et al.,
Defendants.

The Motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company ("Fidelity") for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert
and Joan DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") came on for hearing before
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 28, 1990, at of 1:00
-1-

FILE CQP)'

p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding.
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry &
Associates.

Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale

and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson.
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the
following:

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

1.

Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased

from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed
is referred to herein as the "Property").
2.

While the Building was still under construction,

DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale.
3.

DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title & Abstract

Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the
"Closing").

At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of

closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents").
4.

One of the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and
-2-

Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated
December 13, 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and made a part hereof) . Line 48 of the Closing Statement provided
for payment of $79,247.16 to be made to Cascade at the Closing.
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on
the

Building

(the

"Subcontractors").

The

Closing

Statement

specifically stated:
The undersigned Buyer [DeBrys] and Seller
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing
statement and authorize Utah Title & Abstract
Company, to complete the transaction in
accordance herewith. All instruments may
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed,
[emphasis added].
5.

Pursuant to DeBrys1 and Cascadefs Closing Statement,

Utah Title disbursed the $14 3,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but
only $57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $21,923.82 was
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization.

These amounts

were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-Woodbury").
6.

As a further part of the Closing, DeBrys also

executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust deed on the
Property in the amount of $62,500.00, representing the balance of
the purchase price for the Building and Property to be paid by
-3-

DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written
Closing Statement at line 7.
7•

DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and

Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded.
8.

In connection with the Closing, DeBry, Cascade, and

Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger
Agreement"

(DeBrys1

Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted

by

counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part
hereof). Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and
although

"various

issues

concerning

the

construction

remain

unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily
supplied by Seller."
9.

DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys1 Escrow

Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed would be escrowed with Utah
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues.

DeBrys1 Escrow

Agreement specifically provided
that the amount of increase in allowances,
the decrease in the charge of any extras, the
-4-

increase in any credits, and the amount paid
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic,1
to perform which the parties agree to or which
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are
entitled to, shall be deducted from the
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note
rthe Note! and Trust Deed, Until the disputes
which exists Tsic.] concerning allowances,
extras, credits and unfinished work are
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise,
Buyers may also deduct all funds owed it
f sic.] under the warranty described in
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for workmanship and materials] and Seller's obligation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's
indemnification against mechanic's liens]
from the amounts owed under the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added].

10.

By letter dated December 16, 1985 (three days

after the date of the signed Closing Statement), Mr. Jeffrey K.
Woodbury ("Woodbury"), attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury
(the "Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof).

Richards-

Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds on the
title" of the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was
expressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions
to

use

Richards-Woodbury's

loan

encumbrances and "clouds on title."
-5-

proceeds

to

clear

those

11.

The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further

stated:
After you have determined that all the liens
and clouds on the property [the Property]
have been satisfied and removed and that the
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be
a first lien, vou may disburse the remaining
funds from the check described in paragraph
8. above [the $485,973.35 check representing
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodbury•s
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises
[emphasis added].

In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury
did not intend by the words "clouds on the property11 to refer to
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license or building
permit to construct the Building. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having or not
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically
did not refer to any lack of a contractor's license or building
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title.
12.

DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and others

for the alleged faulty construction of the Building.

DeBrys named

Utah Title as one of many defendants and asserted the following
claims against Utah Title:
a.

That

Cascade

did

not have

a

license or building permit to construct the Building.

contractor's
DeBrys

claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the

Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions,
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should not have disbursed to
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and
building permit.
b.

That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse

any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
c.

That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for

allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
13.

Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended

their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant.

In their

Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter of
Utah Title for the purpose of issuing title policies, and that
pursuant to §31A-23-308, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), Fidelity is
liable for Utah Title's alleged misconduct. §31A-23-308 states, in
relevant part:
Any title company represented by one or more
title insurance agents, is directly and
primarily liable to others dealing with the
title insurance agents for the receipt and
-7-

disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all those transactions
where a commitment or binder for or policy
or contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the title insurance
company has been issued or distributed.
14.

After Fidelity was brought into this action as a

party Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7.

The Chapter 7

proceeding is still pending.
15.

Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

The DeBrys were

also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some
of the Closing Documents, including DeBry!s Escrow Agreement.
16.

Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed

after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, the
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law:

1.

Any lack of a contractor's license or building

permit by Cascade did not create a cloud on the title to the
Property.
-8-

2.

Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah
Title to determine whether Cascade had a contractor's license or a
building permit.
3.

There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents,

including without limitation in the Closing Statement or DeBrys1
Escrow Agreement.

If there were any ambiguities in DeBrys1 Escrow

Agreement,' they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the
document.
4.

The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with

respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified,
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents
themselves without the need for any parol evidence.
5.

The Closing Documents authorized immediate

disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the
Closing Statement) and the balance owing to Seller (line 48 of the
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys.

The oral

agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written
Closing . Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the
introduction of any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements.
6.

The

December

16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow

Instructions were intended to protect someone other than DeBrys.
DeBrys are not third-party beneficiaries of the December 16, 1985
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to
-9-

assert any alleged violation of those instructions*
7.

There was no violation of the Closing Documents by

Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah
Title in connection with the Closing.
8.

Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under §31A-23-308,

Utah Code Annotated.

Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to

DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement
regarding the Property.
9.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law,
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeBrys should be
granted.
10.

As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor.
Dated this

day of

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge

-10-

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
/

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this 2j£

da

Y

of

April, 1990,

to:
Edward T. Wells
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid,
this

day of April, 1990 to:

Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
#185 So. State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Cascade Construction
c/o Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thrugood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Jeff Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 8 4107

Robert Hughes
50 West 300 South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrimac Court
Vallejo, California

Craig Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

94859

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 84116

Stanley Postma
2571 South 75 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Van Ellsworth
1414 Laburnum Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Carling
SHEARER & CARLING
200 South Main Street, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84 010

Glen Roberts
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER
2677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Darwin C. Hansen
MORGAN & HANSEN
136 South Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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I hereby certify thar a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS 0? UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
;

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this 'j^'cay cf April, 1950,
to:
Edvard T. Weils
4252 Sou-h 700 East

Salt La>:e cicy, UT

S41C7

CZ?>TIFICXTF OF HAILING
I hereby certify

t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t ccpy cf

the

f c r s g c i n g FINDINGS CF UNDISPUTED M-.TEF.IAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS CF
LAV CN FIDELITY
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Cascade Construction
c/o Del 3artel
?. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT.
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thrugood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Jeff Silvestrini
COKNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Del 3artel
?. 0. 3cx 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes

Dale Thurgocd

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Re., F 6 0 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

50 West 300 South, ^1000

Salt Lake City, Utah

4455 South 700 East, #300

Salt Lake City, Utah
Lee Allen Barrel
110 Merrinac Court
Vallejo, California

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 84116

84107

94859

84101

Craig Peterson
LITTLEEIELD « PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Stanley Postma
2 571 South 7 5 West
3cuntifui, Utah 8 4 010

Van Ellsworth
1414 Laburnun Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Cariing
SHEXRES. i CABLING
200 South Main Street, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
5 05 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah S4 01C

Glen Roberts
WOCZ-3URY, EETTILYCN & KESLER
2 577 Parley's VTay
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 109

Darvin C. Hansen
MORGAN « HANSEN
13 6 South Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

EXHIBIT C
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Robert J. Daler No. 0808
Lynn c. McMurray, No.' 2213
Attorneys for Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company and
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
Canada Life Assurance Ccapany
455 East 500 South, Suite*3 00
Salt LaXe City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (8 01) 532-5125

z- '•' ;**

\usi

G:^

U

^C.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL" DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. DE3RY AND JOAN DE3RY

Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIA
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. al.,
Defendants,

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Consolidated Civil No, C56-553
Judce Paz 5. Brian
vs.
D^ERY, an individual
Defendants

The Morion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company ("Fidelity") for Surmary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert
and Jean DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") cane en for hearing before
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 22,

1590, at cf 1:00

p.a. r the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding.
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeEry «
Associates.

Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale

and Lynn C. McMurray of Mcliurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson.
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
considered the memoranda submitted in suppcrt of and opposition to
the notion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully
and duly

inferred in the premises, the Court now enters the

following:

rrypiNGs o?

1.

UNDISPUTED HATSRTAL TACTS

Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased

from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed
is referred to herein as the "Property").
2.

While the Building was still under construction,

DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale.
2.

DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title £ Abstract

Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the
"Closing") .

At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of

closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents").
4.

One cf the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and

Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated
December 13; 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit X
and made a part hereof) . Line 4 3 of the Closing Statement provided
for payment of $79,247.16 to is made to Cascade at the Closing.
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked en
the

Building

(the

"Subcontractors") .

The

Closing

Statement

specifically stated:
The undersigned 3uyer [DeBrys] and Seller
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing
statement ana authorize Utah Title « Abstract
Company, to complete the transaction in
accordance herewith. All instruments mav
be delivered cr recorded and funds disbursed.
[emphas is added].
5.

Pursuant to DeBrys1 and Cascade's Closing Statement,

Utah Title disbursed the $143,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but
only S57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $T1,923.S2 was
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization.

These amounts

were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Ccrpcration ("Richards -Woodbury") .
6.

As a further part cf the Closing, DeBrys also

executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust dee,i en the
Property in the amount cf $52,500.00, representing the balance cf
the murchase price for the 3uildinc and Prcpertv to be taid by

<\ r,Qc-c

increase in any credits; and the amount paid
by'Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic.1
to perform which the parties agree to cr which
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are
entitled to, shall be deducted from the
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note
rthe Notel and Trust Deed. Until the disputes
which exists rsic.1 concerning allowances,
extras, credits and unfinished work are
resolved either by Agreement cr otherwise,
3uvers mav also deduct all funds owed -it
rsic. ] under the warranty described in
paragraph 2 [Cascaded warranty for workmanship and materials] and Seller's obligation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's
indennificaticn against mechanic's liens]
from the amounts owed under the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added].

10.

By letter dated December 16, IS£5 (three days

after the came of the signed Closing Statement) , Mr. Jeffrey K.
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , attorney fcr Richards-Woodbury, gave written
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury
(the "Pochards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;n a copy cf which is
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof) . RichardsWoodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds en the
title" cf the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was
e>:pressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions
to

use

Richarcs-Wocdbury' s

loan

encumbrances and "clouds en title."

proceeds

to

clear

those

11 •

The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further

stated:
After you have determined that all the liens
and clouds on the orooertv [the Property]
have been satisfied and removed and that the
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be
a first lien, vou nsv disburse the remaininc
• funds fror. the check described in oaracranh
S. above [the 5485,973.25 check representing
the total loan proceeds frcn ?.ichards-Woodbury' s
lean to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises
[enphas is added]•

In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury
did not intend by the words "clouds en the property" to refer to
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license cr building
permit to construct the Building. Koreoever, the Richards-Woodbury
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having cr net
having a contractor's license cr building permit, and specifically
did net refer to any lack cf a contractor's license cr building
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title.
12.

DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and ethers

for the alleged faulty construction cf the Building.

DeErys naned

Utah Title as one cf nany defendants and asserted the following
ciair.s against Utah Title:
a.

That

Cascade

did

not

have

a

contractor's

license cr build* nc ce^t^t to const*^uct the Build inc.

DeBrvs

ciair.ee that this constituted a "cloud" en the title cf the

J.*JO

.J*->

Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions,
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should net have disbursed to
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor f s license and
building permit.
b.

That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse

any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
c.

That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys fcr

allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
13.

Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended

their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their
Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter cf
Utah Title for the purpose cf issuing title policies, and that
pursuant to S21A-23-30S, Utah Code Annotated (UCA) , Fidelity is
liable for Utah Title1s alleged misconduct. §31A-23-30S states, in
relevant tarti
Any title company represented by one cr more
title insurance agents, is directly and
primarily liable to ctners dealing with the
title insurance acents fcr the receipt and

disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all these transactions
where a commitment or binder for or policy
or contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the title insurance
company has been issued or distributed.
14 .

After Fidelity was brought into this action as a

parry Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 BarJiruptcy
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7.

The Chapter 7

proceeding is still pending.
15.

Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

The De3rys were

also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some
cf the Closing Documents, including De3ryfs Escrow Agreement.
15.

Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed

after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action.

CCKCLCSIONS OF LA~

Based en the foregoing undisputed material facts,
Court hereby enters the following conclusions cf law:

1.

Any lack cf a contractor's license cr building

permit by Cascade did net create a cloud en the title to the
Prcoertv.

2.

Neither

the December

16,

19 85

Richards-Woodbury

Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required DtcLh
Title to determine vhether Cascade had a contractor's license or a
building permit.
3.

There is no ambiguity

in the Closing Documents,

including without limitation i: the Closing Statement cr DeBrys•
Escrow Agreement.

If there were any ambiguities in De3rysf Escrow

Agreement:, they would be construed against DeErys, who prepared the
document.
4.

The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with

respect to line 44 cf the Closing Statement is easily clarified,
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents
themselves without the need for any parol evidence.
5.

The Closing Documents authorized immediate

disbursement of the amounts cue Subcontractors (line 44 of the
Closing Statement) and "he balance owing :o Seller (line 4S of the
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys.
agreements
Closing

The oral

alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written

Documents,

and

the parol

evidence

rule

prohibits

the

introduction cf any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements.
6.

The

December

15,

19S5

Richards-Wcodbury

Escrow

Instructions were intended to protect someone ether than DeBrys.
DeBrys are net third-party beneficiaries cf the December 15, 19E5
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to

assert any alleged violation cf those instructions.
7.

There was no violation of the Closing Documents by

Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah
Title in connection with the Closing.
8.

Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under S31A-22-308,

Utah Code Annotated.
DeHrys

Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to

in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement

regarding the Property.
S.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeHrys as a matter of law,
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeHrys should be
granted.
10.

As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules cf Civil

Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor.
Dated t h i s

s\

,'

day cf
— —

•/. / - /•
•.•-—»

19S0,

W W W •« _ •

I
rzz. c. Brian
District Court Judce

-J

n.

EXHIBIT D

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East .
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915

:^To^—

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS
AND ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS Or FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

|

Defendants.
1

Civil No. C86-553

)

JUDGE PAT S. BRIAN

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs .
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et a l . ,
Defendant.
Plaintiffs

submit.

the

following

objections

and

additions to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted bv defendant Ficelitv National Title Insurance Comoanv.

GENERAL OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS Or FACT
Findings

of

fact

granting of summary judgment.

are

unnecessary

to

support

the

Mountain States v. Atkin, Orient £

Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

All that is required in this case is

that the court enter an order declaring its findings that because
it holds as a matter of law there were no disputed facts on
material issues, judgment was rendered for defendant.
'There is an extensive record in this case.

As long as

the argument and issues have been raised before this Court, the
plaintiffs should be allowed, on appeal, to use any portion of
the record which supports their position.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS Or FACT
Without waiving the C4eneral Objection just mentioned,
the plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact.
the

plaintiffs

do

not

3y making these specific objections,

intend

to

exposition to Fidelity's Motion.

resubmit

or

reargue

their

The plaintiffs do, however,

want to identify these issues which they contend are not properly
submitted as findings and/cr are disputed in the record.
1.

Regarding • finding number 1, the plaintiffs object

to the language "under construction" on the third line.

The fact

is the building was represented to be substantially completed and
a temporary certificate of occupancy was produced at closing to

support the claim that with the exception of a few minor items
set

forth

on

said

certificate,

the

building

was completed.

Plaintiffs never intended and did not believe they were buying a
building which was -under construction."
2.

With respect to finding number 2, the comments to

number 1 above would apply.
3.
object

to

closing
language

With

the

to

finding

characterization

statement
must

respect

be

says.
read

by

number

defendant

Specifically,
together

with

4,

as to what the

plaintiffs

the

approval-of plaintiffs of any dispersals.

plaintiffs

language

claim the
requiring

The specific language

quoted is subject to the approval requirement.
4.

Plaintiffs

object

to

finding

number

5 on the

grounds the court made no findings at the hearing regarding the
manner or method of disbursement.
5.

With respect to paragraph 8, plaintiffs object to

the characterization
court, made

no

of the escrow agreements' meaning.

findings

thereon

and

the

document

The

speaks for

itself.
6.

With respect to paragraph 10, plaintiffs object to

the characterization

cf

the

letter

which

speaks

for itself.

Furthermore, the loan proceeds at that point belonged to DeErys
and such finding should be noted.

7.

There is a disputed fact issue as to the aliened

intent of the Woodbury escrow instructions which should be noted
in the findings•
8.
position
both

With respect to paragraph 12(b), it was and is the

of plaintiffs

oral

and

that the agreement not to disperse was

in writing

and the writing

is evidenced by the

language of the closing statement.
9.
should

show

With
that

respect

to

paragraph

plaintiffs'

claims

12(c),

included

the
the

language
negligent

disbursal cf the escrowed monies.
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The proposed Conclusions of Law contain unnecessary and
inappropriate restatement: of the facts upon which the Conclusions
are

based.

Conclusions

of

law

should

simply

set

forth

the

position cf the Court as to the law applicable to the facts of
the case.
1.
conclusions.

Conclusions
The

lecal

cf

law

numbered

conclusion

is

3 and
"the

4 are nixed

content

is

not

ambicuous."

.A

r* *~\'

2.

A specific finding should be included holding that

S 31A-23-308 does not apply to losses caused by negligence as
this finding was specifically made by the Court.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attornevs for Plaintiffs

EDWARD

WELLS

EXHIBIT E

EDWARD T. WELLS - A34 22
ROBERT 0. DE3RY & ASSOCIATES
A t t o r n e y s for Plaintiffs
4252 South TOO East
Sail Lake City, UT 84 107
Telephone:
(801) 252-SS15
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC:
IN AMD FOR SALT LAK1 : COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT.J. DEBRY and JOAN DESRY,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs .

Civil Nc. ce5-533
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
1KSUHAMCS CO. , s- &i. ,
JUDGE PAT E. BRIAN
Defendants.

Notice

tiffs

Del-

herebv
herein

j - ; - ; ^^ Utah

Ccu
cra.-.cinc

is

su-miary

jurig;ne::t

- Robert

civen
najnec,

~""cm the
in

favor

iir.ai order
sc

r^ -

hereby

J.

appeal

DeBry
to

the

and Joan,
Supreme

crier of the District Cou**of

Fidelity

oursuar.c

to

National

Title

P.uie 54(b) cf tiie

Civil Procedure on *i=y 2 , 1??0.

' * ,r, r*-^

-'

A-Z^l cav of Kay, 1S20.
.s I^LAJ}
-ticns'^s

L ^_

r

i -> ; ^ - ; r s

o
r ii

PnDv

CERTIFICATE Or MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoina
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al. ) was mailed, on the
*^2^?__ cay of May, 1990, to the following:
Cascade Construction
Robert Huches
c/o Del Bartel
50 West 300 South #1000
P.O. Bex 7234
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Hurray, UT 84 107
Randall L. Skeen
Cascade Enterprises
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #500
c/o Dale Thurgood
Salt Lake City,-UT 64105
4455 South 700 East #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Has 1am
Del Bartel
185 South State #700
P.O. Box 7 2 34
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Murray, UT • 84 107
D» Michael Nielsen
Dale Thurgood
505 South Main Street
4 4 55 South 7 00 East =3 00
Bountiful, UT 64010
Salt Lake City, UT 84 107
Darwin C. Hansen
* — ©i
>eo *n--jILJ.en -~artei
13 5 South Main, Eighth Floor
110 Kerrirnac Csurr
Salt Lake City, UT* 64101
V a i i e j o , CA

945c3

Glen P.cherts
2 5 7 7 Parley's W ay
Salt Lake Citv
UT

Craic Peterson
425 South 500 East
C .2 " —

s i- »

r

;

•••

Ttrri

C > ^ O *}

8-10 9

Van Ellsworth
14 14 Laburnum Street

S t a n 1 e v Pes t r* a
2571 Suuth 73 west
B o u r. t i f u 1
UT
£-C" Q

r^en cartel
12133 Clay Star Rd
Herald, CA 9 3538

Lvnn W C W M — ~v
435 East 500*South #30
Salt Lake Cily, UT 84111

\j

r

•*

•>

EXHIBIT F

W- w I

Lynn C. McMurray, #2213
McKURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE £ PARKINSON
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
ROBERT J. DE3RY AND JOAN DE5RY,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF! S
OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO
AMEND PROPOSED FINDINGS CF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C36-553
vs.
Judce Pat E. Brian
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. al.f
Defendants.
CAJ

,IFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
^1

?.'r,4-,'

x^:

vs.
jisAi , an mcivicua.
Defendants.

Undisputed Material Facts and Conclusions of Lav on Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company's Kotion for Summary Judgment)
and its Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fidelity.. National
Title Insurance Company Against Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and
Joan De3ry.

Thereafter, on May 4, 1990, Plaintiff submitted

Plaintiff's Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Lav.

No party having requested era! argument,

and the Court being fully and duly informed in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 motion pursuant to
Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 10 amend the proposed
Findings cf Fact and Conclusions ,tf* JLaw be and is herebv denied.
DATED this

// day oSvKc^enber, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
Attcrnevs for Defendant:

cr?'

-r- nr err'

I hereby certify that Z mailed a copy cf the foregoing Orde:
Denying Plaintiff's Objections and Kotion to Amend Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions cf Lav, first-c^ass postage
therecn fully prepaid this 11/°^ dav cf November, 199 0, to:

r

::=oHH.c?:D/Lr«/e

Thcnas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
#165 So. State Street, #700
Salt Lake City,-UT - 84111

Curtis Z. Drake
Michael A. Peterson
RICHARDS, BRANDT, KILLER &
NELSON
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake'City, UT 84110

Cascade Construction
c/o Del 3artel
P. O. 3ox 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East, £300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Jeff Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT k SEGAL
P. O. Bex 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah S41-.7

Del Bartel
P. O. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 300 South, F'1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dale Thurgood
4 4 55 South 7 00 East, #3 00
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., £600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrimac Court
Vallejc, California

Craig Peterson
LITTLEEIELD « PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

94859

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 84116

Stanley Pcstr.a
2571 South 75 West
Bountiful, Utah 84 010

Van Ellsworth
1414'Laburnum Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Carling

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
5C5 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

2650 Beneficial Life Tower
26 S. State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 111
Glen Roberts
WOODBURY, BETTILYCN « KESLER
2677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Darwin C. Hansen
MORGAN « HANSEN
13 6 South Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DeBRY * ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah S41C7
o ^

!'V,,

EXHIBIT G

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellants
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

1
)
;

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

AFFIDAVIT OF
EDWARD T. WELLS

vs.
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INS.C CO.

i

Case No. 920269-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

i

Category 16

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Edward T. Wells, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel of record for appellants herein.

2.

The copy of the December 11, 1990 order signed by the

trial court in this case which was mailed to my office by counsel
for Fidelity National Insurance Company ("Fidelity") was mistakenly
filed without my having seen the proposed order.
3.

When

I became

aware

of the order

as a result of

appellees' brief, I filed a motion to vacate the order or to amend
out references to Rule 52(b).

4.

My memorandum

in support

of the motion

specifically

raised Fidelity's procedural violations as a reason for my failure
to become aware of the position of Fidelity that my Rule 4-504
objections might be considered to be a Rule 52(b) motion.
5.

At oral argument before Judge Brian I argued:
a)

That

a

filing

mistake

had

denied

to me

actual

notice of the proposed December 11, 1990 order;
b)

That

Fidelity

had

violated

numerous

procedural

rules"in submitting the December 11, 1990 order;
c)

That

had* ^Fidelity

followed

procedural

rules,

I

would have received additional notices and become
aware

there was

an

issue regarding

whether

the

objections I had filed to the form of the May 2,
1990 order was a Rule 52(b) motion; and
d)

That had I received the three notices contemplated
by

Rules

4-501

and

4-504,

I

could

have

either

properly responded to the proposed order or filed a
new notice of appeal and the original case could
have been heard on its merits.
6.

No party to this appeal has ever asserted that the DeBrys

failed to raise Fidelity's procedural errors in the lower court.

2

7.

I have discussed this issue with counsel for Fidelity and

he agrees that the issue of Fidelity's alleged procedural omissions
and errors was argued to Judge Brian.
/ -^ day of July, 1992.

DATED this

EDWARD T. WELLS
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this

•4

*7

day of

, 1992.

RESIDING IN:

My Commission Expires:

JANR1R1E

mztHBUC'Smzeim

c'oR06EHTJ.DeBRV4ASSOC
4252 SOUTH 700 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84107

COMM. EXP. 0641-95
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD T. WELLS. (DeBry v. Fidelity) was mailed,
postage prepaid, on the

/

day of

following:

Lynn McMurray
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3J-040/jn
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, 1992, to the

EXHIBIT H

subjects addressed in the parol agreements.

A finding of

integration is, nonetheless, implicit in the trial court's
Findings of Fact.
5.
Fidelity is not liable under 531A-23-308 for Utah
Title's alleged negligent misrepresentation tort.
That statute contains absolutely no language making an
underwriter liable for the torts of its title insurance agents.
DeBrys1 common law agency argument against Fidelity in its brief
was not pleaded or argued below, is not supported in the record,
is being raised for the first time on appeal, and is the subject
of a totally separate lawsuit filed by DeBrys.

Moreover,

negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on an alleged
misrepresentation of a "future event," as opposed to a
representation of an existing material fact.
IX • ARGUMENT
1.

THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Two days after the Court below entered Summary Judgment in

favor of Fidelity, DeBrys filed a motion to amend and make
additions to the findings of fact.

Before the district court

entered its order denying their motion, DeBrys filed their only
notice of appeal ever filed.

Under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, DeBrys' notice of appeal has no effect:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court
by any party . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact,
the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such
motion . . . A notice of appeal filed before
the disposition of any [such motion] shall
have no effect, A new notice of appeal must
be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order of the trial
17

court disposing of the motion as provided
above [emphasis added].
On December 11, 1990, the trial court denied DeBrys' motion
in an order stating as follows in relevant part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law be and is hereby
denied. (R. 12917; App. Z).
The 30 day period for filing DeBrys1 Notice of Appeal thus began
to run on December 11, 1990, and DeBrys1 prior May 22, 1990
Notice of Appeal therefore was filed prematurely and was totally
ineffective.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in Transamerica
Cash Reserve> Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986) , that a
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-judgment
motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court.

Also, in Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P. 2d 999 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988) , this Court held that a post-judgment motion like this
suspends the finality of the judgment, and that a notice of
appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion by entry
of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an
appellate court.

Because DeBrys filed their notice of appeal

before obtaining a ruling on their proposed additions to the
findings of fact, their notice of appeal was ineffective to
confer jurisdiction on this Court, and this appeal therefore
should be dismissed.

2.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW ONLY THOSE CLAIMS RAISED IN DEBRYS1
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IGNORE THOSE ISSUES NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE IT.
18
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

BX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

)

Plaintiffs,

]

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
vs.

]

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

]
]

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,

i
]

Civil No. C86-553

Plaintiff,
vs.

|

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60 f Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiff moves the court for an order amending
the court's

order

denying

Plaintiff's

Objections

to Proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which order was signed
December 11, 1990.
Plaintiff

seeks

amendment

of

the

order

to

delete

references to a Rule 52(b) motion because no such motion was ever

1 T/i97

filed.

The order should reflect only that objections to the

"proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" were denied and
that

the

court

entered

the

proposed

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law as submitted by counsel for defendant Fidelity.
Plaintiff requests oral argument pursuant to Rule 4501(3)(b) and 4-501(4).
DATED this yS/

day of September, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EDWARD T. WELLS

13428

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER (ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED^. (DeBry v. Cascade,
et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the

September,

1991, to the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-880/jn
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EXHIBIT J

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

]

Plaintiffs,

]i
i
;

vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

]

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,

i
j

Civil No. C86-553

;i

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,

]

Defendant.
Pursuant

to

]
Rule

4-501(1) (a),

plaintiffs

file

this

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Order,
BACKGROUND
On March 28, 1990 the court heard and granted the motion
of

Fidelity

National

Title

Insurance

"Fidelity") for summary judgment.

Company

(hereinafter

Following this hearing, counsel

for Fidelity submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law to the court along with a proposed judgment.

Prior to becoming aware that the court had signed and
entered the proposed findings and conclusions plaintiffs1 counsel
filed plaintiffs1 objections ana additions to proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration,

See, Affidavit of Edward T. Wells,

attached as Exhibit A.
Upon receiving notice the court had signed the findings
and

judgment, plaintiffs1

counsel

assumed

the

objections

were

overruled by the court and notice of appeal was then timely filed.
Counsel

for

Fidelity

never

filed

a

response

to

plaintiffs1

objections.
On November

16, 1990, counsel

for

Fidelity

filed

a

document entitled order denying plaintiffs1 objections and motion
to amend proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This

document was signed by the court December 11, 1990. The said order
provides:
Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 52(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law be and hereby is denied.
Defendant Fidelity now seeks dismissal of plaintiffs'
appeal at the court of appeals on the ground the notice of appeal
was not filed after denial of a Rule 52(b) motion to amend the
judgment.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to vacate or
amend the order to delete references to a Rule 52(b) motion because
no such motion was ever filed.
JURISDICTION TO HEAR MOTION
This matter is presently before the Utah Court of Appeals
on the appeal by plaintiff of this court's order granting summary
judgment to Fidelity.
In Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App.
1988) . The Utah Court of Appeals held that a Rule 60 motion may be
considered by the trial court while the appeal is pending.
ARGUMENT
This court should amend the order entered December 11,
1990

to

remove

the

language

relating

to

Rule

52(b)

for

the

following reasons:
1.

Plaintiff did not File a Rule 52(b) Motion.
The order purports to deny a Rule 52(b) motion allegedly

filed by plaintiffs.

No such motion was ever filed.

The pleading

filed clearly states it is "objections and additions to proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law" (emphasis added) . Rule 4504 clearly allows such a filing.
a motion.

The pleading is not labeled as

Rule 52(b) is nowhere mentioned.

3

At the time of filing,

counsel for plaintiff was not aware judgment had been signed and
was attempting to object under Rule 4-504.

See, Exhibit A.

Thus, it is clear there was no Rule 52(b) motion.
If Plaintifffs objections are in fact construed by the
court to be a Rule 52 fb) motion,. then the order
complained of was entered in violation of procedural
rules.

2.

If, notwithstanding the argument in Section 1, above, the
court construes plaintiff's objections to be a Rule 52(b) motion,
then the order of December 11, 1990 was entered in violation of the
procedural mandate of Rule 4-501(1) of the Civil Rules of Practice.
If, for the sake of argument, we assume the objections were in fact
a Rule 52(b) motion, then before the motion could be lawfully
submitted to the court for signing, the provisions of Rule 4-501(1)
would

need

mandatory.

to be followed.

Rule 4-501(1) (d) is explicit and

Before a motion can be submitted to the court for

decision a separate written pleading captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision" with a certificate showing mailing to all parties
must be filed.

The rule is explicit "if neither party files a

notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision."
There was never a notice to submit for decision filed by
defendant Fidelity.
failure

to

file

In fact, under Rule 4-501(b),

a response

to the

alleged

Rule

Fidelity's

52(b)

motion

precludes them from submitting the matter for decision.

If a

memorandum in opposition is not filed, rule 4-501(1)(b) provides
4

for submission for decision under Rule 4-501(1) (d) only by the
T^vvipg party.
Since the procedure necessary to file and submit a motion
for decision was clearly not followed and in fact Rule 4-501 (d) was
violated by Fidelity in submitting the order for signature, the
court should either:
a)

vacate the order and sign an amended order deleting
references to Rule 52(b) and clearly stating that
objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or

b)

vacate the December 11, 1990 Order and require Rule
4-501 to be followed prior to entry of a new order.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the court should grant
the motion of plaintiff and either:
a)

vacate the order and enter a new order deleting
references

to

Rule

52(b)

and

clearly

stating

objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or
b)

vacate the order and require compliance with Rule
4-501(1).

DATED this

.
day of September, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

"
5

EDWARD T. WELLS "

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND ORDER, (DeBry v. Cascade,

0 7Pday

et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the „^—/^
1991, to the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-881/jn
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of September,

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

|

Plaintiffs,
vs.

I
;

AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD T.
WELLS

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
i
]

Civil No. C86-553

;
]i

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.

]

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Edward T. Wells, being duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel for plaintiff in reference to matters

related to defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance (hereinafter
"Fidelity").

2.

On or before May 4, 1990, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Practice, I prepared Objections to Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which had been proposed by
counsel for Fidelity as part of an order granting summary judgment.
3.

I signed the objections on May 4, 1991.

4.

At the time the objections were prepared and signed,

I was not aware the judgment had been signed.
5.

There was no mention of Rule 52(b) in the objections

filed and I had no intent to involve Rule 52(b) because I was not
aware a judgment had been entered.
6.

No

Rule

52(b)

motion

has

ever

been

filed

by

plaintiff regarding the Fidelity judgment.
7.

I have never received a pleading from Fidelityfs

counsel which purported to respond to my objections or to be a
memorandum in opposition to a Rule 52(b) motion.
8.

I have never received from counsel for Fidelity a

notice to submit a Rule 52(b) motion for decision.
9.

I have never received from anyone a notice to submit

for decision under Rule 4-501(1) (d) with respect to the objections
to proposed findings signed by me on May 4, 1990.
10.

I

have

never

filed

objections for decision.

2

a

notice

to

submit

such

y(L

DATED th

un

day of September, 1991,

•" EDWARD T. WELLS

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this

NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING IN:

res:

3
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day of

/? /
K^/JCLLJ/~
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I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD T. WELLS,

(DeRry v. Cascade, et al.) was

mailed, postage prepaid, on the ,^A /the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-882/jn
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915

"
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

]
;
|
])

vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
AMEND ORDER

)
;
)

CASE NO. C83-553

I

JUDGE PAT BRIAN

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et a l . ,
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Fidelity has not disputed any of the facts set out
in the memorandum of plaintiff in support of the motion to amend
the order centered herein December 11, 1990.
accepted

as true.

Therefore, they are

Defendants have not contested the

statements

contained in the affidavit filed in support of the motion.

Plaintiff disputes the characterization of "facts" contained
in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:
a)

The objections to proposed findings were mooted when the
court entered the judgment. No formal order was needed.

b)

Defendant's characterization of a "loose end" remaining
is spurious.

No motion was pending.

The court had not

been asked to do anything to the judgment entered on May
2, 1990.

The letters referred to (Exhibit C & D) were

not delivered to counsel.
ARGUMENT
Counsel for defendants have cited to the court no legal
authority and have filed no affidavits to support their position.
The entire basis for the language which is objected to in the
December 11, 1990 order is defense counsel's "characterization" of
plaintiff's objections to the proposed findings as a Rule 52(b)
motion.
A motion is defined in law as an application to a court for an
order.

E.g. . Wolff v. Wolff. 25 Or. App. 739, 550 P.2d 1388

(1976); Iverson v. Second Judicial District Court, 66 Nev. 145, 206
P.2d 755 (1949); Williams v. Denning. 260 N.C. 539, 133 S.E.2d 150,
151 (1963); Schoenberg v. Benner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 359, 367 (Cal. App.
1967); Behm v. Division of Administration, 275 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla.
2

App. 1973); State v. James, 347 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Mo. 1961); Elliot
v. Elliot, 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 1990); People v. Thomas,
34 111. App.3d 1002, 341 N.E.2d 178, 182 (1976); see. Black's Law
Dictionary at 1164 (4th ed. 1951).
Counsel cannot convert objections to proposed findings into a
Rule 52(b) motion merely because part of the "objections" was a
suggestion additional findings were needed. Rule 52(b) is nowhere
mentioned in the pleading filed by plaintiff.
no relief at all, let alone Rule 52(b) relief.
type of relief is sought.
amended.
Id.

Plaintiff asked for
No order or other

There is no suggestion any order be

The pleading is simply and by definition not a motion.

Contrary

to

the

argument

of

defendant

the

pleading

"substantially" cannot be a motion because it seeks no relief and
asks for no order.

.Id.

Thus, the language in the December 11

order is not only baseless, but it mischaracterizes the pleading as
a matter of law.

On its face the pleading is an objection to

proposed findings.

Defendants cite not one case to support their

position. The cases cited herein by plaintiff defining a "motion"
are representative of the general rule.
Since no Rule 52(b) motion was filed, the questioned language
should be stricken because a court cannot deny a non-existent
motion.

3

POINT II
THE MANNER OF ENTERING THE ORDER WAS
PROCEDURALLY IRREGULAR
Notwithstanding defendants' argument to the contrary, the
entry of the December 11, 1990 order was procedurally irregular and
improper.
Simply stated, the procedure under Rule 4-501 is as follows:
1.

A motion is filed and a supporting memorandum must

accompany the motion unless uncontested or ex parte [(Rule 4501(a)] (the fact no memorandum accompanied plaintiff's objections
argues no motion was intended).
2.

The responding party may file a responsive memorandum

within ten days.
for decision.

If no memo is filed, the moving party may submit

By failing to file a response, the right to submit

for decision is waived.
3.

[Rule 4-501(b)].

If a responsive memorandum is filed the moving party may

file a reply within five days. (Rule 4-501(c)].
4.

Jf. a responsive memo was filed, then five days later,

whether or not a reply is filed, either party may then file a
notice to submit for decision [Rule 4-501(d)].
The reasons why the December 11, 1990 order was irregular and
improperly entered are as follows:
1.

A motion was not filed by definition.

supra.
4

Elliot v. Elliot,

2.

Defendants did not respond pursuant to Rule 4-501(b).

Thus, Rule 4-501(c) and (d) do not come into play.
3.

Even assuming, arguendo, defendant could properly submit

the supposed motion for decision, defendant failed to follow the
requirements of Rule 4-501(d) by filing a notice to submit for
decision.
Thus, Rule 4-501 was not properly complied with in this case.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised herein were not before the court when
the order was signed.

The court has signed an order wherein

defense counsel mischaracterized the matter pending before the
court.

As a matter of law, there was no Rule 52(b) motion and

therefore, the court must strike from its December 11, 1990 order
all references to a supposed ruling on a non-existent Rule 52 (b)
motion.

DATED this

day of

/j^C^^/vC^v---, 1991.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By: /J&,JL<-<

*T7 IMCJXJ

EDWARD T . WELLS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND ORDER. (DeBry
v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the
of December, 1991, to the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-889/jn
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EXHIBIT L

DeBry v. Fidelity N ional Title Ins, Co.
182 Utah
y. Rep. 51
51
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Cite as
Administration,2 Fidelity submitted the prop182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51
osed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment to the trial court on May 2, 1990.
IN THE
That same day, the trial court signed and the
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
clerk of the court entered the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment.
Robert J. DeBRY and Joan DeBry,
On May 7, 1990, five days after entry of
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
judgment, DeBrys filed a document entitled
•.
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
INSURANCE CO.,
Law." In the document, DeBrys objected to
Defendant and Appellee.
various findings of fact and conclusions of law
and argued that specific additional findings of
No. 910329-CA
fact and conclusions of law should be made by
FILED: March 18,1992
the trial court. On May 22, 1990, DeBrys filed
a notice of appeal "from the order ... granting
Third District, Salt Lake County
summary judgment ... entered ... on May 2,
Honorable Pat B. Brian
1990."
On November 16, 1990, Fidelity mailed to
ATTORNEYS:
DeBrys' counsel a copy of a proposed order
Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for
denying DeBrys' objections and additions to
Appellants
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt
law. The proposed order characterized
Lake City, for Appellee
DeBrys' objections and additions as a motion
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Russon.
Procedure.3 DeBrys did not object to the
proposed order. Thereafter, on December U ,
1990, the trial court signed the order expressly
This opinion is subject to revision before
construing DeBrys' objections and additions
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
as a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule
GARFF, Judge:
52(b). The court's order, a copy of which had
This is an appeal from a summary judgment been previously mailed to DeBrys' counsel on
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs, Robert November 16, 1990, stated, "IT IS HEREBY
J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (DeBrys), against ORDERED that Plaintiffs* motion pursuant
defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Company (Fidelity). The summary judgment to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and
was certified by the trial court for appeal Conclusions of Law be and is hereby denied."
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil DeBrys did not file a notice of appeal after the
Procedure. The underlying action, which inv- court's December 11, 1990, order, nor did
olves multiple parties and multiple causes of they object to the order until some ten months
action,1 stems from DeBrys' purchase of an later on October 21, 1991, when they filed a
office building. As a threshold matter, Fidelity motion to amend pursuant to Rule 60, Utah
claims that notice of appeal was not timely Rules of Civil Procedure. After oral argument,
4
filed, and therefore, this appeal should be the trial court denied the motion to amend.
dismissed. Because timely notice of appeal is
DeBrys argue that their document concerjurisdictional, Armstrong Rubber Co. v. ning objections and additions to proposed
Bastion, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); findings of fact and conclusions of law was
Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah not a Rule 52(b) motion and that the trial
1983), we must first determine whether court erred in construing it as such.5 In deteDeBrys* notice of appeal was timely.
rmining whether the court properly characteOn March 28, 1990, after DeBrys and Fid- rized DeBrys* document, we look to the docelity presented oral argument, the trial court ument's substance rather than its caption. See
granted Fidelity's motion for summary judg- Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-48 (citing Howard
ment. The court directed Fidelity to prepare v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, 356
and submit to the court proposed findings of P.2d 275, 276 (I960)); GaUardo v. Bolinder,
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam).
conformity with the court's ruling. Utah R. The court's conclusion that DeBrys' document constituted a Rule 52(b) motion is legal
Civ. P. 52(a).
On April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered in nature; thus, it is accorded no particular
to DeBrys' counsel a copy of the proposed deference and reviewed for correctness.
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and jud- Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
gment. All other counsel were served by mail 467, 470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v.
on April 25, 1990. After allowing the five- Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah
day objections period to run, as specified in 1988); but see Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521
CODE^CO
Provo, Utah

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51

P.2d 1287, 1288-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974)
(reviewing for "abuse of discretion'' trial
court's construction of motion to vacate as
motion to amend under Rule 59(e)).
DeBrys insist that their document concerning objections and additions to findings of
fact and conclusions of law should not have
been construed as a Rule 52(b) motion because
it did not constitute a "motion" per se.* They
reason that because their document was an
objection and not a post-judgment motion,
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) does
not apply, and that their notice of appeal was
valid and that hence this court has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal.7
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion
filed within ten days of the entry of judgment
that questions the correctness of the court's
findings and conclusions is properly treated as
a post-judgment motion under either Rules
52(b) or 59(e).« Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 134748; GaUardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Vreeken v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Or. 1983). The
substance of a motion, not its caption, is
controlling.9 See Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1348;
GaUardo, 800 P.2d at 817. In the instant case,
DeBrys* motion in substance requested the
trial court to amend and make additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
request recognized by Rule 52(b). Furthermore, DeBrys' motion was timely inasmuch as
it was filed five days after entry of judgment.10
Based on the circumstances and the substance of DeBrys' motion, the trial court did
not err in disposing of it as a post-judgment
motion pursuant to Rule 52(b).11
Moreover, because the trial court, under
Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, can still alter or amend the judgment, amend its findings, or make additional
findings, a notice of appeal is of no effect if
filed prior to the disposition of a postjudgment motion under any of these rules. "A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective
to confer jurisdiction upon this court." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); accord
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); U-M Invs. v. Ray,
658 P.2d 1186, 1186-87 (Utah 1982) (per
curiam). Once a timely post-judgment
motion is made pursuant to one of these rules,
to permit an appeal would be an affront to
judicial economy inasmuch as the very
purpose of such a motion is to allow a trial
court to correct its own errors, thus avoiding
needless appeals. Cf. 17-Af Invs., 65S P.2d at
1187 (recognizing that the requirement of
filing a notice of appeal after disposition of a
post-judgment motion "may assist in discouraging delay in the judicial process"); 9
James W. Moore et a/., Moore's Federal
Practice 204.12[1], at 4-68, 4-69 & n.5 (2d
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ed. 1991) (stating that "[t]he very purpose of
such [post-judgmentj motions is to permit
the trial court to correct its own errors, and
thus avoid needless appeals").
In the instant case, summary judgment was
entered on May 2, 1990. DeBrys filed their
Rule 52(b) motion on May 7, 1990, and their
notice of appeal on May 22, 1990. The trial
court denied DeBrys' Rule 52(b) motion on
December 11, 1990. No further appeal was
filed. As previously noted, Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires the filing of
a new notice of appeal within the prescribed
time after entry of the trial court's order disposing of a Rule 52(b) post-judgment
motion. Because DeBrys failed to file a notice
of appeal after the court denied their postjudgment motion, we are without jurisdiction
and the appeal is dismissed.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Appeals involving other parties in this action are
now before this court.
2. Rule 4-504(2) provides that *[c]opies of the
proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be
served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after service. *
3. Rule 52(b) provides in relevant part that "[ujpon
motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings
or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly."
4. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend is
the subject of a separate notice of appeal filed on
January 28,1992.
5. In addition, DeBrys contend that the court erred
by prematurely signing the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment before the time for
objections had run pursuant to Rule 4-504(2),
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. DeBrys'
counsel was served with a copy of the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment
on April 24, 1990, and all other counsel were served
by mail on April 25, 1990. This service by mail, they
claim, added three days to their five-day objections
period of Rule 4-504(2), and therefore, all counsel
had until May 7, 1990, to file their objections. Utah
R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e).
DeBrys' argument is without merit. They were
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment on April 24, 1990.
Pursuant to the five-day objections period of Rule
4-504(2), excluding the intermediate Saturday and
Sunday as required by Rule 6(a), DeBrys' objections
were due May 1, 1990. On May 2, 1990, the trial
court signed and the clerk of the court entered the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.
Although the five-day objections period for
other counsel had not yet run, inasmuch as they
were served by mail on April 25, 1990, the court's
apparent oversight is inconsequential for two
reasons. First, no other parties had an interest in
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Collier • Heinz
Provo Utah
182 Utah , dv Rep 53
_ _
nor did they oppose Fidelity's motion for summary
Cite as
judgment Second, no objections were filed by other
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 53
counsel, nor have other counsel complained that
they should have been allowed to file objections.
6 A motion is an application made to the court for
IN THE
the purpose of obtaining a ruling or order directing
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
some act to be done in favor of the applicant Elliot
v Elliot, 797 S.W 2d 388, 392 (Tex Ct App 1990)
Myrne M. COLLIER, as personal
7 Rule 4(b) provides m relevant part
representative of the Estate of James A.
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
Collier,
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial
Plaintiff and Appellee,
court by any party
under Rule 52(b)
v.
to amend or make additional findings of
Kerry
M.
HEINZ
and Southwest Virginia
fact, whether or not an alteration of the
Shopping Center Associates, a Utah limited
judgment would be required if the
partnership,
motion is granted . the time for appeal
Defendants and Appellant.
for all parties shall run from the entry
of the order denying
such motion A
notice of appeal filed before the dispoNo. 900138-CA
sition of any of the above motions shall
FILED: March 19, 1992
have no effect A new nonce of appeal
must be filed withm the prescribed time
Third District, Salt Lake County
measured from the entry of the order of
Honorable Kenneth Rigtnip
the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above
ATTORNEYS.
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for
8 Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or
Appellant
amend the judgment shall be served not later than
10 days after entry of the judgment "
Randy S. Feil, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
9 This is consistent with the requirement that the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally const- Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
rued. Utah R. Civ P 1(a)
This opinion is subject to revision before
10 Additional reasons support the trial court's
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
constructton of DeBrys' motion as a Rule 52(b) postjudgment motion. After filing their motion, DeBrys
made no attempt to withdraw the motion, nor did ORME, Judge:
they attempt to communicate to the trial court that
Defendant Heinz appeals the trial court's
it was not a post-judgment motion Despite their judgment interpreting a settlement agreement
knowledge that judgment had been entered five days m favor of plaintiff, the personal representaprior to the filing of their motion, DeBrys proce- tive of the Estate of James A. Collier. Heinz
eded to file a notice of appeal Moreover, by receiving a copy of the proposed order almost a month also appeals the trial court's award of attobefore the trial court's order disposing of their rney fees to the estate We affirm the trial
motion, DeBrys were on notice that the court would court's interpretation of the settlement agreconstrue their motion as a Rule 52(b) post- ement and reverse the award of attorney fees.
judgment motion.
FACTS
11 The instant case is readily distinguishable from
Defendant Heinz and James Collier were
Nccnngs v Utah State Bar, 817 P 2d 320 (Utah
1991), where the Utah Supreme Court held that business partners in a number of general and
motions for entry of findings, pursuant to Rule limited partnerships Upon Collier's death,
52(a) or (b), filed after a trial court's granting of Heinz and some of these partnerships brought
summary judgment without findings of fact, does claims against Collier's estate relating to the
not toll the time for appeal Id at 321-23 In partnership agreements. Similarly, the estate
contrast, the trial court in the case at bar sua sponte filed claims against Heinz and many of the
requested and signed findings of fact and conclus- partnerships.
ions of law after granting Fidelity's motion for
On February 12, 1988, after months of
summary judgment Moreover, DeBrys* postjudgment motion, in contrast with that filed m Necr- negotiations, the estate and Heinz, both repmgSy did not request an entry of findings, resented by counsel, entered into a settlement
rather it requested the trial court to amend and agreement. In this agreement, Heinz gave up
make additional findings of fact and conclusions of certain rights and claims against the estate in
law
consideration for the estate's release of some
of its rights and claims against Heinz. Subsequent to this agreement, a dispute arose over
the rights of Heinz and the estate concerning
the distribution of assets from one of their
dissolved partnerships. Under the settlement
agreement, the estate maintained a fifty
percent general partnership interest m that
partnership. The trial court held that the lanUTAH ADVAN CE REPORTS
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PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Both parties have filed memoranda in
response to the motion. We summarily affirm on the basis that
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review.
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity). On
April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to appellants7 counsel.
The findings were mailed to all other counsel on April 25, 1990.
On May 2, 1990, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment to the trial court, and the court
signed the findings, conclusions, and judgment.
Five days after the judgment was entered, appellants filed
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The document objected to the
findings and conclusions and asserted that specific additional

findings and conclusions should be mac
r- May 22, 1990,
appellants filed a notice of appeal fr-.n trie- trial court's May 2
order granting summary judgment. On December 11, 19. 3, the trial
court characterized appellants' objections as a Rule 52(b) motion
and denied the motion. Appellants did not file a notice of
appeal from the December 11, 1990 order. As a result, this court
dismissed appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the
basis that appellants failed to file a new notice of appeal after
the court denied appellants Rule 52(b) motion. DeBry v. Fidelity
National Title Ins. Co., 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. March
18, 1992). On December 21, 1991, appellants filed a motion to
amend the December 11, 1990 order. The court denied the motion,
and appellants filed this appeal.
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated seven
procedural rules in obtaining the December 11, 1990 order.
However, on November 16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel
a copy of the proposed order denying appellants' objections and
additions to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Appellants did not object to the proposed order and did not raise
any of the alleged procedural irregularities. In addition,
appellants' motion to amend the December 11 order did not mention
any of the asserted irregularities but merely sought to delete
references to Rule 52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity committed
procedural violations in obtaining the December 11 order.
We summarily affirm on the basis that the appeal presents no
substantial issue for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(c). We decline
to award attorney fees on appeal.
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Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions
(5)(C) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for
"court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "presiding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdivision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "February 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivision (7); and made stylistic changes throughout.
The 1990 amendment, in Subdivision (1)
added "or if the statement is made on behalf of
a business or corporation, a statement that the
business or corporation" to the introductory
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete Ianguage relating to appraisals and inserted "prepared by a certified public accountant"; redesignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4),

Rule 4-501

and renumbered the remaining subdivisions
accordingly, making appropriate reference
changes throughout; in present Subdivision
(3), deleted "audited" before "financial statement" and substituted "surety" for "company"
in the first sentence and substituted "the
value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of
credit dollars" in the second sentence; in
present Subdivision (5), substituted "current
assets" for "real assets" in two places; and rewrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table
setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstanding to net worth value,
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commercial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading,
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification"
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and
substantially rewrote the rule.

Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of* the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy;
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this
rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de967

Rule 4-501

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
968
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a-request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
- matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court. "
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following "supporting documentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
in Subdivision (3)(b).
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Rule 4-504, Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small
claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) ..Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon oPTKVfijpp-fipimgglWnrp Vainer nyesented \n t f |p court, for s t a t u r e unless
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.,,
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
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(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court,
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "except small claims" under "Applicability" and
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement
of the Rule.

The 1991 amendment added the final sentence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not
of record" following "courts of record" in the
Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivision (10).

Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavi
of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the
Statement of the Rule:
**
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must
the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award,
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent
the claimoto judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matte]
for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonat
fees for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persor
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate bi
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sui
expected will require considerable additional work to collect,
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consis
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred
in pursuit of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they
conform to the provisions of this rule and to state statute and case law.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "be filed with the court and" in
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements
other than hourly rates, added the designation

(2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision
(1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivision designation and the phrase beginning
"and" at the end.
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404 to 406, Reference «=» 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99
et seq.

PART VII.
JUDGMENT,
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
158
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whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs-in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January I, 1985. See,
now, Rule 34(d), UtahR.App.P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b).
Judges* retirement fee, taxing as costs,
§ 49-6-301.
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule
62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs
—In general.
—Challenge of award
—Depositions
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Appealability.
-"-Attorney's fee award.

—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
—Review of finality.
—Separate claim.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on unpleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty
Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings
Specific performance request.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited
Absence of express determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
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Rule 35

entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice
and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment
which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force
and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the
clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court upon the request of either party
made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment.
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to
have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within
the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill,
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 1009 to 1024.

C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979.
Key Numbers. — Costs *» 221 et seq.

Rule 35, Petition for rehearing.
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A
petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by
order. The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact
which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless requested by the court. The answer to the petition for rehearing shall be filed
within 14 days after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless
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otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in
the absence of a request for an answer.
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by
Rule 27 and copies shall be served and filed as prescribed by Rule 26. Except
by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by
the court shall not exceed 15 pages.
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing
will not be received by the clerk.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsubstantially redrafted to provide definitions sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
and procedures for assessing penalties for de- first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
lays and frivolous appeals.
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Ifan appeal is found to be frivolous, the court Anders v California, 386 US 738 (1967) and
must award damages. This is in keeping with State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the law of these cases, appointed counHowever, the amount of damages — single or sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to the defendant, and the court must find the apthe discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the apto make express the authority of the court to peal.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 978 to 984.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 1408
to 1452.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 829
to 835.

Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur.
(a) Date of issuance. The remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the
remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order disposing of the petition. The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed,
enlarged, or shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of
the court, any direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall
constitute the remittitur.
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending review. A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application for review may be
granted on motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or
for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying,
restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must
ordinarily be made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision
appealed from. A motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court,
but the motion shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is
not practicable, or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a
motion or has failed to afford the relief which the movant requested, with the
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